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Türkiye’de Ekonomik Krizler: Liberal Ütopyadan Keynesci 
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Abstract
As Turkey’s growth numbers signalled negative news about the near future, possible economic remedies 
to solve an upcoming economic slowdown have been discussed. In this article by looking at the financial 
and banking sector performance of the country during 2001 local and 2008 global crisis, I tried to 
compare two mainstream strands of theory, i.e. liberal and Keynesian approaches to the economic 
crisis. It seems like the country has experienced a neo-liberal, unregulated financial episode until 2001 
crisis, while in post-2001 period we have witnessed more regulatory and Keynesian financial remedies 
which were successful to save the country from more harmful effects of the Great Recession. Those 
Keynesian style regulations were mainly inspired from the effects of changes within the governing style 
of international financial institutions. But in the final section of the analysis, through pointing out the 
potential triggers for another economic crisis, this article argues that though Keynesian solutions are 
more logical and helpful in alleviating the symptoms of crisis, they could not make Turkey crisis-free. 
High current account deficits, persistent inflation, adamant unemployment and insufficient domestic 
production in the face of rising imports, all of these can be classified as the symptoms of the still 
crisis prone economic structure in the country. Then, other, more radical alternatives should be on the 
agenda for a better future.
Keywords: Keynesian, Neo-Liberal, Turkey, Crisis
Öz
Türkiye’de durağan seyreden büyüme rakamları, yakın gelecekte büyümenin nasıl canlandırılabileceği 
tartışmalarının ana konusu. Özellikle 90lı yıllarını ve 2000’lerin başlarını ülkeyi derinden sarsan 
ekonomik krizlerle geçirmiş bir toplumda potansiyel krizlerin nasıl önlenebileceği tartışmaların 
önemini daha da artırmakta. Bu çalışmada ise 2001 ve 2008’deki ekonomik kriz evrelerinde ülkenin 
bankacılık ve finansal sektör performansı üzerinden liberal ve Keynesçi akımların ekonomik 
modelleri inceleniyor. Türkiye 2001 yılı ortalarına kadar Özal ve Çiller-Demirel yıllarında 
oluşturulmuş daha serbest ve düzensiz bir liberal finans sistemi içindeyken, 2001 sonrası Keynesçi 
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sayılabilecek finansal düzenlemeler ülkeyi 2008 krizinin şiddetli etkilerinden korumada yardımcı 
olmuştu. Bu başkalaşımın sebeplerinden biri Dünya Bankası ve IMF gibi kuruluşlardaki mantalite 
değişikliğiydi. 2000’li yılların ortalarında Dünya Bankasındaki eleştirilerin baş ismi Stiglitz’in 
fikirlerine yakın Kemal Derviş’in Türkiye’deki programı yönetmesi, Keynesyan etkiyi güçlendirecekti. 
Fakat makalenin son bölümünde dış kaynaklı krizleri tetikleyebilecek mekanizmaların gösterdiği 
gibi Keynesçi finansal düzenlemeler krizin etkilerini azaltmakta başarılı olsa da Türkiye’yi tamamen 
potansiyel krizlerden muaf hale getirmiyor. Kronik cari açıklar, yüksek seyreden enflasyon, inelastik 
yapıdaki işsizlik rakamları ve ithalatı karşılamada yetersiz yerli üretim, kriz eğilimlerinin ülke 
ekonomisinde devam ettiğinin başlıca göstergeleri. Bu durumda, başka radikal alternatiflerin de 
gelecek tasarımlarında yer tutması gerekiyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Keynesçi, Neo-Liberal, Türkiye, Kriz
Introduction:
Since the beginning of the 2008 crisis the main disputes in recession-torn economies and societies 
regarding possible solutions have revolved, not around an ontological critique of the market 
economy, but around epistemological arguments that involve Liberals and Keynesians. This 
dispute entails two distinct points. On the one hand is the liberal notion of sustaining investor 
confidence through austerity and downsizing the state role in economic decision-making. This 
stems from the liberal idea, the main proponents of which are Reinhardt, Rogoff et al., that the 
reason for the crisis was unnecessary government involvement in economy. On the other hand, 
Keynesians argue that the reason for the crisis was the fundamentalist belief in the wisdom of 
unfettered markets in allocating resources, and consecutive bubbles largely engendered by that 
financial profligacy. Therefore, according to Krugman et al., any method that aims to return to 
sustainable growth should be centered on increasing both regulation and government stimulus 
efforts.
Since it played a huge role in saving Turkish financial institutions from the harmful effects of 
the last great crisis, I find the Keynesian regulatory alternative more logical for the present-
day ills of the capitalist economy. But the partial regulatory policies of this method failing to 
solve the more perennial and structural problems of the country, exchange rate volatility, high 
unemployment and unsustainable current account deficits all point to the possibility of a new 
crisis erupting. By comparing and analyzing Turkish banking sector performance throughout 
the two recent significant crises, i.e. 2001 local and 2008 global, this paper will theoretically 
clarify the above-mentioned idea that the Keynesian regulatory alternative is more amenable 
in controlling the excesses of market economies. However, the final part of the essay will 
rest on the argument that the relative success of Keynesians is limited, since like the liberals, 
they do not understand the inseparability of economic policy from the real social relations 
of production. On the agenda, then for a stable future economic model, should be serious 
consideration of Marxian alternatives.
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What is Liberal Utopia?
In order to explain the main distinctions among liberals and other strands of political economy 
one has to clarify the utopian vision of liberal economics. From the days of Adam Smith, 
Friedrich Hayek, Austrian school to Milton Friedman, liberal economics operated around 
certain assumptions which mainly depended on the smooth mechanics of the invisible hand. 
That invisible hand is nothing other than the unintentional actions of market participants which 
allegedly work through assumptions such as perfect competition, efficiency of price mechanism 
to convey information and fundamental equilibrium of supply and demand. Most liberal pundits 
concurred that any outside intervention to these efficient market and free trade would distort 
those factors that were mentioned as assumptions above. Thus, in the world of liberals free-trade 
and free markets are above societal and political discussions and almost god given technicalities. 
This utopian vision first encountered its biggest criticism around late 1920’s when J. Maynard 
Keynes lucidly displayed their logical faults in the midst of Great Depression, but 70’crisis of 
Fordism and Welfare state brought back the liberal doctrine from the shelves this time with a 
new name neo-liberalism. 30 years after the most world countries one way or another immersed 
in the rules of markets,2008 crisis and ensuing recessionary tendencies once again escalated the 
criticisms towards neo-liberal paradigm. Below I will try to explain why liberal economics and 
their application is utopia in itself through the arguments of two influential scholars of political 
economy. J. Maynard Keynes and Karl Polanyi.
Keynes first and foremost argument against the laissez faire economics was that the notions of free 
enterprise and property rights and the framework in which they existed were socially agreed and 
not necessarily results of God-given natural rights. Under those conditions individual utilitarian 
calculations could not be all rational or bring collective benefits at the end either. According to 
Keynes, since everyone needs other peoples’ cooperation in capitalist economy some individual 
actions may derive from pure self-interest or outright irrational incentives (Keynes, 1925). 
Furthermore, conditions that worked well for the free market and trade of 19th century could 
not last forever as the 1920’s economic indicators and social patterns signified a totally different 
circumstance. In here Keynes pointed out the need of liberal theory to update itself to historical 
changes (Keynes, 1963).
Second issue one comes across the writings of J. Maynard Keynes was his opinions on the factors 
like uncertainty and risks that underpinned the competition in free markets, for him these are 
not incentives to a better societal condition on the contrary they can be a source of excessive 
speculation, unemployment and unproductive investments. In order to divert all savings to real 
economy someone has to regulate this inherent tendency of markets for increasing volatility and 
instability. Keynes thought that liberal approach on free trade is too chaotic to achieve desired 
results, someone especially the state has to intervene and regulate these untamed behaviors. As 
an extension of these arguments we can also pointed out Keynes’ criticism of supply-demand 
equilibrium as a myth since according to him in a constantly changing environment and 
conditions, that point at a time is a very rare incident if it ever occurs. Psychology of market 
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participants and their swift reactions based on expectations would not permit that kind of 
smooth transaction between supply and demand. A lot of times state has to coordinate excesses 
or insufficiencies on both sides of equation and institutions such as central bank is mainly needed 
to correct those market externalities (Skidelsky, 1992).
Karl Polanyi, wrote just after the Great Depression and through the years of war and destruction, 
had more fundamental criticisms towards the liberal, free market practice. For him, markets 
and its competitive logic since 19th century gradually encompassed all human activities and 
subjected them to dictates of free market utopia. Polanyi argued that three important factors that 
is crucial for a secure and stable human life, i.e. land, labor and money, were subordinated to the 
commoditization frenzy of market economy. These three factors throughout the history provide 
most important substances to reproduction of human societies but after the industrial revolution 
and market economies’ competitive production and consumption became so central in human 
activities, over accumulation of land through urban sprawl and associated environmental damage 
occurred (Polanyi, 1944). On the issue of labor, Polanyi pointed out that unemployment, anarchic 
and insecure structure of labor trade under free markets created stress and depress human 
psychology as most of the time workers were vulnerable to the industrial power of capitalists. 
About the usage of money, speculative activities and money hoarding to provide security for 
future in anarchic free markets would distort the supply and demand. That is a sure way for 
financial and economic crisis since diverting money from its real function in production towards 
finance spur more uncertainty to the market economy. For Polanyi, these three factors in human 
society should not be alienated from their original purpose as their subjugation to exchange value 
rather than their role for use values in human life would inevitably steer counter response from 
society itself (Polanyi, 1944).
Polanyi called this societal response against the vagaries of market economy, double movement. 
In his book, The Great Transformation, main examples that were shown as examples of this 
counter movement started with British Speenhamland laws, a measure to protect the most 
vulnerable from the worst effects of fledgling capitalism. With the speed up of industrialization 
minimum wage laws followed the same pattern (Polanyi,1944). When leading capitalist country 
U.S. faced the worst consequences of the Great Depression, society undertook New Deal policies. 
Furthermore, since the end of World war 2 from capital controls of Bretton Woods to rising 
social welfare states can also be given as examples of this counter movement. In the aftermath of 
2008 financial crisis, the current questioning of neo-liberal prescriptions and the logic of markets 
would verify that another double movement is in preparation.
Throughout this essay in line with above argument while we question the liberal utopia and how 
Keynesians tried to find remedies, on the last part in Turkish economy the period from 1984-
2001 will be evaluated as a practice of liberal, free market utopia. The period in the wake of 2001 
crisis, especially the banking and institutional reforms of Dervis era after 2003 can be considered 
as Keynesian response, since Kemal Dervis was from the World Bank which was questioning 
the applicability of neo-liberal adjustment programs under the influence of its chief economist 
Joseph Stiglitz just after the Asian economic crisis (Stiglitz, 2000).
Turkey: In the Midst of Crisis, Between Liberal Utopia and Keynesian Regulation
249
The 2008 Global Crisis Liberal-Keynesian Dispute: Liberal View
As explained before, the reasons for and possible solutions to the deepening global crisis since 
the collapse of the U.S sub-prime mortgage market have been much discussed among major neo-
liberal and Keynesian economists. Before getting into their detailed explanatory models, one can 
see that although Hayek’s followers are still assertive in their arguments, Polanyi-style or radical 
alternatives to existing market relationships have been largely overlooked in the last five years. In 
the juxtaposition below, I try to outline the rival thoughts within the process of the evolving crisis 
in both political and economic arenas.
Current neo-classical economists, in line with the mentality of Hayek’s methodological 
individualism, tend to have a blind spot when it comes to any inherent structural problems 
within capitalist social relationships, and emphasize instead the exogenous shocks or human-
made mistakes as the probable causes of the crisis. Since capitalist markets accurately reflect the 
behavior of self-interested rational man, and combine this with the ceterus paribus assumptions 
on perfect competition, the power of price signals, and the recurring equilibrium of demand 
and supply, there cannot exist an internal crisis tendency associated with market economy. So, 
how do neo-liberals define the emergence of the 2008 financial crisis? Most stressed excessive 
government intervention in the housing market: CRA and affordable housing policies forced 
the government-subsidized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to underwrite huge amounts of sub-
prime mortgages, which in turn fed the housing bubble in the U.S. Wallison further argued that 
those government subsides also lowered mortgage lending standards and resulted in increasing 
numbers of delinquencies (Wallison, 2009). As expected, those defaults diminished the assets 
of the population, and paved the way for a recession. John Taylor in his endeavor to explain 
what went wrong in pre-2007 period, argued that series of government actions and interventions 
paved the way for the crisis and also prolonged it.
According to Taylor, first mistake was treasury’s unusually loose monetary policy and loose 
housing credit guarantees of government agencies like Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. After the 
housing boom, Federal Reserve Bank misdiagnosed the problem as liquidity crisis, instead of an 
uncertainty crisis regarding the value of sub-prime assets. Resulting ad-hoc bail-out packages 
in mid-2008 and unpredictable terms of the TARP legislation created sharp rises in market 
uncertainties (Taylor, 2009). For Jeffrey Friedman, the resultant crisis after 2008 was the crisis of 
politics rather than finance as decades long attempts to create hybrid capitalism through web of 
regulations failed in 2007. He blamed the government’s certain actions and inactions throughout 
the prior decade, as government intervention into housing markets through its sponsored 
agencies distort market signals and opened way for moral hazard behavior since most actors did 
not know the precise role of regulations and its limits over the housing market (Friedman, 2009).
On a different note, Alan Greenspan blamed the emergence of the crisis on the formation of what 
he called ‘irrational exuberance’ among banks and investors pertaining to house and related assets 
prices, which spurred excessive risk-taking on the part of market actors. For example, Ivashina 
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and Scharfestein pointed out how the widespread and reckless short-term credits to borrowers 
before the housing price bubble burst made banks vulnerable to bank runs and as an extension, 
that behavior largely froze up the credit markets during the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfestein, 
2010). That behavior was also supported by bank’s increasing reliance on off-balance sheets in 
dealing with securitized mortgages followed by lax regulation of off-balance sheet operations that 
predictably decreased the capital reserves of subject banks. (Acharya and Richardson, 2009) In the 
same strand, Erkens and Hung argued that increasingly risky investment strategies undertaken 
by financial firms and banks prior to crisis stemmed from short-term incentives of shareholders 
and their disproportionate leverage over the managers of those firms. On the other side, they 
added that firms with management who were more independent from shareholder pressure were 
more cautious, thus delved into sub-prime market less. So, one of the most important causes of 
the crisis was the failed risk management strategies of financial and banking companies. (Erkens, 
Hung and Matos, 2012; Brunnermeier, 2009). William W. Lang and J. Jagtiani saw the problem 
as linked to failing risk management strategies of banks and financial institutions, relying on 
untested risk models which failed to correctly predict the housing downturn (Lang and Jagtiani, 
2010).
At worst, in mainstream economics, these repeated bust and boom cycles were interpreted 
as a common occurrence in the system, a sort of business cycle. Some even argued that these 
cycles turn out to be useful in the end, since they cleanse the market of unproductive capital 
and idle capacity. Thus, neo-liberal economists sought out the causes of the crisis in symptoms 
of capitalist-social relationships. For example, any acceptance of the Hayekian assumption that 
market prices usually give consumers the best possible information is clearly contradicted by 
banks’ failed risk management strategies. Without any inherent fault in the operation of markets, 
how could this phenomenon of ‘irrational exuberance’ ride roughshod over people’s common 
sense? Methodological individualism and bankers’ sophisticated mathematical formulae did not 
provide sound risk management models, as these equations were incapable of questioning either 
the basic assumptions of their theory or the historical underpinnings of the rise and dominance 
of financial capital.
Keynesians’ View
Although they did not want to fundamentally alter the nature of the market economy, Keynesian 
economists raised objections to certain assumptions of the laissez faire approach. First, they 
disputed the self-correcting equilibrium of demand and supply forces when faced with the 
anarchic features of markets and the role of human psychological expectations associated with 
the trajectory of markets. These uncertainties usually feed unemployment and unused capacities, 
since investors have no ability to correctly predict the perfect amount of investment that an 
economy needs at any specific time or in any specific place (Stiglitz, 1993). Beyond a threshold, lack 
of investment and resulting unemployment create recessions due to lack of demand, a situation 
which can return to full employment goal and sustainable growth only through monetary and 
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fiscal intervention by an external source, namely the state (Keynes, 2006). Furthermore, since the 
days of J. Maynard Keynes, his intellectual followers have had no confidence in the credit and 
financial markets, since Keynes himself depicted them as casino- style institutions. Thus, they 
proposed close regulation of financial markets and investment banks. What we understand from 
these points regarding macro-economics is that Keynesians, through accepting basic promises 
such as the role of supply and demand, and priority of capital, do not see any inherent problem in 
the capitalist mode of production. Any associated faults with market economy can be corrected 
through sound management of aggregate demand, coupled with prudent financial regulation.
As is to be expected, prominent Keynesian economists differ greatly from the neo-liberal school, 
either in their diagnosis of what caused the Great Recession or the possible remedies for the main 
problems of the current economy. Paul Krugman from Princeton University was among notable 
experts who argued that the reason behind the 2008 crisis was the great majority’s firm belief in 
the idea of efficient market hypothesis and its assumptions about the actions of rational investors 
in the market place. This efficient market thesis largely caused people and experts to overlook the 
underlying fundamental of economic activity and paved the way to a housing bubble (Krugman, 
2009). Krugman further argued that by issuing derivatives and other products, unregulated 
financial actors like investment banks and hedge funds etc., perpetuated the expanding bubble. 
The sources needed for the bubble economy were coming from rising East Asian markets, who 
channeled their excess savings into the US market, coupled with the US federal reserve’s low 
interest rate policy of 1% from the days of the 2001 recession. With the burst in the house price 
bubble, what lay revealed was the weaknesses of underlying assets, and the resulting reduction of 
value, to the tune of 13,000,000,000 dollars, opened the way to huge indebtedness and collapse of 
demand. The effect of this was job losses of 6,000,000, with this rise in unemployment deepening 
recessionary tendencies in the real economy.
Other Keynesian economist emphasized different causes for the crisis, for Stiglitz, it was the 
deregulation of banking since 1980’s and the increasingly risky behavior undertaken by financial 
institutions, such as replacing traditional, safe financial instruments (i.e. government bonds) 
with riskier assets like sub-prime mortgage derivatives that caused the recession after 2008 
(Stiglitz,2009; Lewis, 2013). On other dimension Stiglitz also shared the views of post-Keynesian 
E. Stockhammer in terms of how rising inequality across advanced economies like US and UK 
created a demand gap between the rich and the poor. According to Stockhammer, declining share 
of wages in capitalist economies generally accompanied by rising share for the capital, which in 
turn feeds a speculative frenzy on risky assets. That situation gradually suppresses the consuming 
propensity of wage earning population and it eventually decreases the profit margins of firms as 
collapsing demand accelerated the slump. Banks’ behavior of taking too much risk under those 
conditions only exacerbate the associated downturn as speculative money tends to flow towards 
financial and more profitable instruments (Stockhammer, 2013; Stiglitz, 2012).
As aforementioned authors pointed out Keynesian strand, like neo-liberals, do not see any 
inherent crisis tendencies in the capitalist system, they either stressed the deregulation and 
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reckless behavior of banks or the lack of aggregate demand as main cause of the crisis. Thus, they 
argued that if these excessive tendencies are curbed through prudent oversight capitalism can 
return its normal growth path.
Turkey: From Liberal Utopia to Keynesian Regulation
In the final section of this paper, Turkey and its financial sector will be evaluated, as it constitutes 
a microcosm of these global discussions regarding the role of free markets and regulatory policies 
on potential crises. As stated above, regulatory reforms and supervision of the Turkish financial 
sector acted as a buffer to protect the country from the most harmful effects of the 2008 financial 
crisis, in contrast to the period of the late 90s and early 2000s, when the country suffered deep 
financial and economic crisis within a relatively short interval. Even with the buffer in place 
though, the country has had to struggle with structural problems such as high unemployment, 
persistent inflation, volatile exchange rates and erratic current account balances, all left over from 
liberal deregulation policies of previous decades. This article now tries to argue that despite the 
success of Keynesian monetary and regulatory policies in preventing financial sector crisis, the 
inherent contradictory tendencies of capitalist economy have remained intact, and that Turkey is 
still standing on the brink of another economic crisis, the tendencies of which would be largely 
determined by external factors.
From the 1980s to the 2001 Crisis
Turkey’s liberalization adventure began just like other underdeveloped countries in the 
immediate aftermath of the collapse of import substitution (ISM) policies and protected markets 
of peripheral Fordism. Turkey tried to sustain demand-led growth throughout the ‘60s and ‘70s 
within controlled capital and exchange rate markets, but eventually reached the limits of this 
strategy when the country’s manufacturing and agricultural exports could not bring in sufficient 
foreign exchange revenues to support the massive requirements of technology spending, 
infrastructure investments and intermediate capital imports to sustain the ISM strategy (Şenses 
and Taymaz, 2003). At the same time, rising labour wages and currency appreciation increased 
the political and economic demands of a rapidly-growing urban population, demands which 
were responded to hostilely by capital culminating in the September 1980 military coup (Boratav, 
1988). That military coup did not just aim to stabilize the security situation in the country, but 
also to provide a convenient political arena in which to apply a neo-liberal economic stabilization 
program, a long-desired dream of the country’s ruling classes. The resulting IMF-induced 
structural adjustment program envisaged large social spending cuts, a decrease in agricultural 
subsidies, trade liberalization, privatization, and gradual but significant depreciation of the 
currency. The most immediate effect on the banking sector was the lifting of restrictive Central 
Bank controls, resulting in the emergence of a plethora of private financial institutions collecting 
deposits from the population on the basis of a Ponzi finance scheme (Boratav,1988). When they 
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collapsed around the mid ‘80s, these groups treated the country to its first experience of a neo-
liberal savings crisis. This did not spread to the entire economy and the banks were allowed to 
open foreign currency deposit accounts and enter international transactions after 1984. When 
this gradual opening of the country’s markets to the outside world did not bring the anticipated 
foreign direct investment, the country decided to engage in a full convertibility and adopt more 
convenient rules for in- and out-flows of capital. Retrospectively, the IMF- supported program’s 
success in stabilizing the current account balance and reducing inflation was broadly dependent 
on the export boom of the mid ‘80s, which in turn was sustained by a massive decline of the share 
of wage labor in the manufacturing sector (Savran, 2002). In addition, wages in the public and 
private sectors remained almost frozen throughout the 80s, thanks to the repressive labor and 
political legislation of the 1982 military junta constitution (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). Labor’s 
share of total revenues in manufacturing dropped to 20.6% in 1988 from 38% in 1977. The next 
wave of trade liberalization in the ‘90s was the dominant class response to declining profitability 
of the real sector, as the popular pressures of wage demands and requests for increasing freedom 
for political organizations mounted towards the end of 1989 (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003).
In the tumultuous years of the New World Order during the ‘90s, Turkey’s full liberalization 
of capital movement was generally expected to bring foreign investment, which could help 
productive sectors that did not get enough capital because of Turkey’s insufficient savings. 
However, these expectations remained unfulfilled, as neither the regulatory framework of the 
financial markets nor the general climate of world trade in terms of emerging markets favored 
positive outcomes for Turkey. In fact, most incoming foreign investments were in the form of 
portfolio investments (hot money) seeking short-term gains. Yeldan has argued that, rather than 
comforting the needs of industrial and manufacturing sector, these short-term money flows in 
and out of Turkey created an unhealthy cycle of dependence for the Turkish economy, in which 
the growth of inflows proportionally affected consumption and investment while outflows 
generally engendered high volatility in the exchange rate (Yeldan, 2001). The reason for this was 
a combination of two factors; growing public indebtedness under persistent high inflation paved 
the way for arbitrage gains for financial actors as the domestic real interest rates were substantially 
higher than those of developed markets, and the effects of persistent political instability in the 
country deriving from a plethora of social conflicts such as the Kurdish issue and unsustainable 
coalition governments whose average stay in power in the ‘90s was no more than 1 or 2 years 
(Yeldan, 2001). Also, in these years growing Islamic opposition and its contestation of the official 
discourse of Turkish secularism intensified these internecine conflicts in the state and ruling 
elites. Between 1991 and 2001, Turkey experienced four economic downturns and two of them, 
in 1994 and 2001, turned out to be severe financial crises. In fact, the downturns in ‘91, ‘94, 
‘99 and 2001 all coincided with emerging market crises in the world economy and substantial 
outflows of foreign currency from the Turkish markets (Seyidoğlu, 2011).
So, in the shallow and volatile conditions of Turkish financial markets, the banking sector 
positioned itself as the government’s main creditor, as successive administrations relieved 
public deficit problems under high inflation with an increase in the issue of treasury bills. Given 
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opportunities for the arbitrage gains, banks usually chose to get credit from international markets 
and supply it to the treasury under excessively high interest rates (Güloğlu-Altınoğlu, 2002). This 
development further exacerbated Turkish banks’ dependence on foreign currency and their 
vulnerabilities to any sudden negative developments in international markets. Any move by the 
government to lower the interest rates would have caused capital outflows, while the same high 
interest rates triggered inflationary pressures as the government resorted to printing money. For 
example, in 1994, the government had to guarantee all deposits in banks to prevent potential bank 
runs in the country. Eight Turkish banks were taken over by the Savings and Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF) in the aftermath of 1994 currency crisis (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003).
As indicators of the health of the sector, foreign currency deposits were almost 43% of all deposits 
in 1999, while 75% of government tax revenues were diverted to repayment of maturing debt on 
treasury bills. Secondly, the Turkish banking sector ratio of transformation of deposits to credit 
was low during the decade. Total credits ratio to bank incomes fell from 69% in 1990 to 38% 
in 2000, which reveals the banking sector’s main revenue source to be financing government 
debt. In those years, the latest research shows, banks had almost no risk management strategies 
in terms of their portfolio and lacked systematic regulation on that front. A further display of 
the disarray of the 1990s was the transfer of banking funds to parent corporations without any 
adequate credit supervision, a transfer facilitated by the lack of regulation in governments’ issuing 
of new banking licenses (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). Hence, in the 1990s, Turkey’s real sector 
(manufacturing and industry) too were involved in the financing of government debt through 
excessively high interest rates by their banking associates. Just after the April 1994 currency 
crisis, the interest rate on treasury bills was around 150% annually. Another corrupt activity in 
the country’s banking and financial sector was shadowy methods of accounting that constantly 
ignored the effects of high inflation on real bank assets. In other words, throughout the 1990s, 
although Turkish banks seemed profitable businesses from the outside, their high operational 
costs and unregulated atmosphere of overall capital market lay in wait as potential triggers of 
crisis in the country (Öniş, 2003).
In the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis, and turmoil in Russian financial markets 
a year on from that, in 1999 the Turkish economy faced another downturn, this time generally 
stemming from the lack of capital inflows to balance the financing needs of banks and the treasury. 
That economic recession forced the government to negotiate another structural adjustment loan 
with the IMF (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). The main target of the agreement was to create an 
exchange rate-based disinflation program to stabilize competitiveness through appreciation of 
currency. Aside from that, the Central Bank was precluded from printing money against domestic 
assets. The remainder of the program was traditional IMF demands in terms of privatization, cuts 
in social spending etc. The first stage of the plan produced some positive results; T-bill interest 
rates decreased to 38% and capital inflows increased, which strengthened international reserves, 
even though 90% of the inflows were in form of portfolio investments (Yeldan, 2001). But, as a 
potential trigger of the eventual crisis, inflation turned out to be a messier issue than expected, 
since wage demands, increasing rents and rising commodity prices of state-owned enterprises fed 
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inflationary expectations. In addition to this, newly-established rules of the program to control 
banking sector reserves and their open foreign currency position limits were never implemented 
effectively because the internal political, religious and social strife mentioned above prevented 
any sound and politically powerful management of the economy. The disarray in terms of power 
was very visible to the financial sector (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003).
In 2000, currency appreciation increased imports by 35% while it spurred on exports by only 
7%. Turkey’s current account deficit again reached 5% of GDP. In November 2000, a speculative 
attack on the Turkish Lira stripped away the illusion of stability and the resulting sudden outflow 
of $5,200,000,000 worsened the situation of domestic banks with large T-bill portfolios (Yeldan, 
2001). These banks, among which the most notorious is Demirbank, tried to find emergency 
funds and thus increased overnight inter-bank rates. The stock market started to drop and the 
Central Bank tried to inject liquidity to the system (BDDK, 2009). But in February 2001, with 
the perfect excuse of a skirmish between the prime minister and president on the economy, a 
massive outflow of foreign currencies began as T-Bill interest rates shot up 70% and overnight 
interest rates climbed to 5000%. With more than $17,000,000,000 left the country, Central Bank 
had to left to defend the value of the currency and accepted free floating (BDDK, 2009). This 
financial crisis, while bankrupting a lot of private banks, cost the state around $53,000,000,000 
in solidifying the liquidity positions of these private and public banks. The country experienced 
a net 8.5% decrease in its GDP, with a 65 % inflation rate. Total GNP dropped 33%. The IMF 
provided the country with $18,000,000,000 in total throughout 2001, as unemployment doubled, 
with the addition of 1.5 million newly- unemployed, and industrial production almost came to 
a halt (Yeldan, 2001). The population’s purchasing power also declined to almost two-thirds of 
pre-crisis levels. When the coalition government decided to call an early election at the end of 
the year, Turkey’s experiment with the unregulated capital markets and banking sector reached 
its limits. Given IMF experiences during the Asian and other emerging market financial crises, 
it was obvious that the liberal utopia of the self-correcting market was an illusion and could no 
longer be continued in Turkey in its pure form.
Post-2001 Years, Turn to Regulation of Finance
In the wake of this severe financial and economic crisis, the IMF and Turkish authorities agreed to 
submit management of the economy to technocrat Kemal Derviş, a veteran World Bank official, 
who declared an anti-inflationary re-stabilization program. Between 2001 and 2005 this program 
aimed first at a restructuring of the financial sector and liberalization, accompanied by regular 
neo-liberal targets such as increasing budget surplus after interest payments, raising indirect 
taxes, and reducing social spending (Öniş, 2003). Central Bank independence was strengthened, 
and with Law 4491, the Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was founded, with 
one of its functions being control of the deposit and savings insurance fund. Other regulatory 
agencies that were formed at the time were the Board of Competition, the Energy Market 
Regulation Board and the Public Bidding Board (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). In the instigation 
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of these changes, one may say that it was not only the failure of unfettered markets that played a 
role, criticisms of experts like Stiglitz, Krugman, and some people in the IMF of the precarious 
situation that unregulated capital movements engendered in the underdeveloped world also 
influenced events and decisions.
On the political side of management of the crisis, with the 2002 election victory of Islamıst AKP 
(Justice and Development Party), Turkey’s political landscape reached some kind of reconciliation 
among competing forces. While the secular metropolitan bourgeoisie accepted the legitimacy of 
an Islamist government, AKP in turn soothed reservations about itself by discarding much of 
the anti-western and radical economic rhetoric of its predecessor, the Welfare Party. On another 
plane, the political system stabilized in the absence of a strong Islamist opposition. Moreover, 
thirty years of a repressive labor regime pretty much crippled any organized working class 
resistance to the crisis or these new reform agendas. AKP also managed to anchor the country to 
the EU negotiation process and a new democratization process. IMF and EU support, coupled 
with the ongoing low interest rate policies of US Federal Reserve, benefited the country with 
an unprecedented glut of foreign funding. In terms of portfolio investments and foreign direct 
investment, Turkey surpassed all its previous records. We may argue that the same savings glut 
that Krugman saw as the reason for the 2008 financial crisis in the US helped Turkey to re-
balance its economy in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis (Öniş, 2009).
Banking Sector Reforms
Immediately after the 2001 crisis, the newly-established BRSA began its job of restructuring. 
28,700,000,000 liras were transferred to public banks to strengthen their balance sheets, while 
their operational tasks in the sector were redefined in order to decrease political patronage 
(BDDK, 2009). Twenty-five private banks were transferred to DSIF with their assets and these 
banks were re-consolidated into six stronger banks. It emerged that most of these private banks 
vaults had been hollowed out by their major shareholders. BRSA decreased all bank branches 
to 33% of pre-crisis levels and at the same time increased bank branch supervisions (BDDK, 
2009). It greatly increased supervisory agent numbers across the sector, while providing legal 
and technical support to bank managers. In terms of reforms of management, in addition to 
emphasizing risk management strategies and stress tests, BRSA made balance sheets and 
managements of banks more transparent. Licensing rules for the opening of new banks became 
much more restrictive (BDDK, 2009). Offshore banking was tied to strict BRSA supervision. 
Inflation adjusted accounting standards were adopted. Other regulatory reforms following these 
were supervision of credit enlargement within defined risk limits, forbidding the existence of out-
of-balance sheets funds, and transforming all derivative, swap, or future options transactions into 
credit transaction accountable to Central Bank reserve requirements (BDDK, 2009).
In the aftermath of the crisis years, the Turkish economy stabilized with the support of EU 
anchor, international support from institutions like the IMF and the WB, and because of the 
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existence of relatively easy money that flowed into Turkey throughout the US housing boom 
years. Chinese and American quantitative easing policies after the 2008 crisis further contributed 
to the economic development of Turkey. Although there are numerous problems pertaining to 
this growth strategy, other than the crisis year of 2009, Turkish GDP numbers showed a stable 
pattern. Turkish interest rates, inflation numbers and credit growth have all displayed positive 
signs since 2002 (BDDK, 2009). The disinflationary program that aimed to suppress foreign 
exchange rates was a success, since inflation dropped to single digits after 2005 from over 30% 
in 2002. This event, coupled with the political stability of these years, (Turkish public debt ratio 
to GDP decreased to 39%) created the perception among the public that the rule of AKP was the 
sole reason for these positive developments (Kibritçioğlu, 2007).
Even after the 2008 crisis, in the banking sector we see a sound financial industry, especially 
compared to Western banks. Turkish bank numbers and their branches have been reduced and 
employment turnovers stabilized, the transformation of deposits to credit has quickened, while 
the share of credits in total transactions of banks increased to 50% during these years. Profitability 
rates of the financial sector have been reinvigorated, from minus levels in 2001 to 12% in 2005 
(BDDK,2009). Also, due to strict BRSA regulations on derivatives and Turkish banks’ offshore 
fund transactions, the country’s banking system did not involve itself in either credit swaps or 
sub-prime mortgage markets throughout the booming period of these debt instruments. Two 
other positive issues that protected Turkish banking from harmful effects of the crisis were the 
relatively modest ratio of foreign currency debts of the country’s banks, and the higher capital 
adequacy ratio of Turkish banks, which was around 18%, compared to 11-12 % rate of European 
banks. Then one may assert that the Keynesian-style macro-economic regulations of the financial 
sector yielded good results, and potentially saved the country from the turmoil of another 
potential crisis during the 2008-09 disaster (Öniş, 2009).
So, the remaining question is whether these partial regulatory policies of Keynesianism in the 
financial sector have mostly eradicated the potential sources of crisis in the Turkish economy. In 
the last part, I will try to show that the answer is no, and that the country could be brought to a 
brink of a crisis at any time due to the structural problems inherent in capitalist growth.
Potential Triggers for Crisis
The important problematic issue for the Turkish economy and its current growth strategy is 
currency appreciation. In a disinflationary program that chooses the exchange rate as the nominal 
anchor, exchange rate stability is a sign to potential investors that the country is a good place for 
investment. However, the Turkish lira began to appreciate against foreign currencies immediately 
after the program’s implementation and as a result, in 2004 Turkish imports of consumption 
goods skyrocketed, with 108% annual growth accompanied by a current account deficit problem 
(Trading Economics, 2014). Since 2002, trends in the increase and decrease of current deficit 
numbers were positively correlated with those of import growth. For example, in 2009, when 
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the global crisis and outflow of funds from Turkey negatively affected economic growth, Turkish 
imports registered a sharp decline. Another controversial point regarding currency appreciation 
is its impact on domestic industries’ competitiveness. Uras wrote that Turkish industry and 
manufacturing is greatly dependent on intermediate commodity import. Value added numbers 
show that in big industrial branches like auto and machinery production, every 100 TL worth 
of goods involved around 88 TL imported value (Uras, 2014) Therefore Turkish manufacturing 
has a very low base of added value in production, which may cripple efforts to break this vicious 
circle between rising growth and rising current deficits. Turkey’s current deficit ratio to GDP is 
just behind that of crisis-torn Greece in the OECD. In the same research, it was noted that only 
3.7% of Turkish exports involved high technology production, while the same number for the 
European average is around 19 % (Uras, 2014).
These processes also reveal the tendency of cheap foreign goods to negatively affect Turkish 
employment. With its relatively low technology intensive and low value added manufacturing 
capacity, Turkey’s employment distribution across different sectors is mainly concentrated in 
the service sector and agriculture, 35 % and 23% respectively (Sönmez, 2013). Industry and 
manufacturing’s share in the distribution has been stagnant for the last decade, at around 16% of 
the work force. One may add the significant effect of IMF program privatization policies to these 
high unemployment patterns, since in the last three decades, the public sector has refrained from 
using its employment-creating power due to the ideological dominance of privatization within 
the economic establishment. These trends then largely explain why the Turkish unemployment 
rate has stubbornly fluctuated between around 10-12% throughout the last decade (Sönmez, 
2013). Even in high growth rate (9%) years like 2011, the unemployment rate did not drop to 
under 9%. If we couple Turkey’s workforce participation rate of around 52%, lower than most of 
its rivals, with a persistent 19-20% youth unemployment rate, it may be argued that this model of 
production and distribution patterns is pregnant with numerous social problems.
The last important issue in Turkey is the stubborn inflationary pressures that the country faces 
despite the so-called success of the last decade’s disinflationary programs. Inflation, though it 
dropped to 5.2 % around 2005, has shown itself to be a persistent feature in more recent years 
(Uras, 2014). Each time the country has entered a high growth pattern, inflation has ticked 
upward. One of the main reasons for this is the lack of savings and sources of investment within 
the country. Turkey’s savings rate was around 12 % in 2012, a figure substantially lower than 
the European average, so any additional need for foreign currency means an upward move for 
Turkish inflation (Colombo, 2014). For example, in just the first third of 2014, inflation reached 
5% in total, largely as a result of the latest exchange rate rises. It is also easy to see that persistent 
inflation has brought with it skewed wealth distribution patterns, since the country is in the 
top three in terms of inequality index of OECD (OECD, 2014). Any potential economic crisis 
stemming from current deficit or external shocks that trigger higher inflation will also increase 
political and social instability in Turkey. Hence, the three related issues of current deficit, high 
unemployment and sticky inflation run as a thread through economic life in Turkey, and are 
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still with us as potential sources of crisis in an external shock situation. The financial and partial 
regulatory policies of Keynesians have so far failed to totally eradicate them.
Also on the issue of politics and its relationship with economy in the country, Rodrik argued that 
AKP governments alleged accomplishments like huge per capita growth rates after 2003 is largely 
a myth since any consideration of inflation adjusted per capita income growth rates indicated 
only %46, which was dismal compared to other emerging market statistics (Brazil, India, Russia, 
Poland). So according to Rodrik, Turkey could not even use those chances of savings glut just 
before the 2008 financial crisis as most of those foreign flows diverted to construction and other 
low value added sectors and could not radically alter the production patterns of the country 
(Rodrik, 2015).
On a different take, Buğra and Bedirhanoğlu argued that gradually the difference between 
modern bourgeois form of state and the AKP rule has been emerging as the Erdoğan and his 
circle increasingly resort to politics of clientelism in distribution of state resources. For example, 
the regulations that design the public procurement and bidding processes were changed more 
than hundred times during party’s rule (Buğra, 2015). Buğra further added that this soaring 
symbiosis between the part of the private sector and the AKP created what she called a rift 
between what big industrialist groups like TUSİAD envisioned when they supported the party’s 
neo-liberal agenda earlier and the supposed Islamization of politics that those close to Erdogan’s 
inner circle demands. Bedirhanoglu thought that the religion became a means or a convenient 
tool in continuation of this clientelistic link (Bedirhanoğlu, 2015). It seems like these two authors 
agreed that typical bourgeois rule demand a more autonomous sphere for economic activity and 
state should be more neutral towards the competing social groups under Turkish neo-liberalism. 
EU agenda of the ruling circles in mid-2000’s largely planned a more technocratic management 
of economy and fast adaptation to EU standards. But in these days AKP and Erdogan’s personal 
style which reduces the independence of judiciary and press, and vocal calls for an end to 
parliamentary system rendered the country more vulnerable to political and economic shocks 
as the country’s growth strategy depends on the continuous flow of foreign funds. So, the events 
of last three four years did not help to promote the stability picture that the ruling party tried to 
create
Conclusion
In the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, the main pundits of political economy did not, as 
expected, engage in any ontological and historical critique of the dominant relationships, but 
tended to confine the controversy to the liberal-Keynesian framework. However, this framework, 
while revealing the insufficiency of markets in controlling the excesses of financial actors, has 
failed to find a proper long-term stabilizer for the future of capitalism
As a microcosm of that dispute, my research on the Turkish financial sector drew comparisons 
between two financial crises, 2001 and 2008. This research clarifies the fact that Keynesian 
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policies of government intervention in and regulation of financial activities were superior to the 
almost utopian attitudes of neo-liberals. The Turkish economy and financial sector entered the 
2001 crisis as a result of almost entirely free and unregulated markets, and turned to Keynesian-
style regulatory policies immediately afterwards to repair the destruction done. Therefore, the 
almost intact and unscathed condition of the country’s financial system after the 2008 global 
crisis surely points to the aforementioned superiority of the Keynesian method.
However, in the final analysis, and despite initial success, years after the 2008 crisis the Turkish 
economy and society are still in the grip of structural problems of capitalist markets. As recounted 
above, these are chronic high unemployment, vast current account deficits and its associated 
problems in foreign exchange parities, and persistent inflation. These factors may be triggers for 
a social or economic crisis at any time and render the country especially vulnerable to external 
shocks originating in international markets. Hence, it is obvious that Keynesian solutions are not 
enough to make the system crisis-free. What they fail to consider is that the capitalist mode of 
production is structurally embedded in the social relations of respective societies, i.e. they fail 
to see that it is futile to separate economics from politics. Without an ontological and historical 
critique of our present system, as Marx and Polanyi undertook in earlier times, we cannot find 
definite answers to the crisis-prone nature of market economy. Thus, there is an international 
need for a radical alternative as a potential solution, although the feasibility of such an alternative 
greatly depends on the deliberation and conscious intervention of human societies into our 
history.
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